In cognitive radio networks (CRN), primary users can lease out their unused bandwidth to secondary users in return for a fee. We study price competition in a CRN with multiple primaries and multiple secondaries in a region, where each primary tries to attract secondaries by setting a lower price for his bandwidth than other primaries. A CRN has two distinctive features, which makes the price competition very different from that in traditional commodity markets. First, in every slot, each primary may or may not have unused bandwidth available. So primaries are uncertain about the number of other primaries from whom they face competition. Second, spectrum is a commodity that allows spatial reuse: the same band can be simultaneously used at far-off locations without interference; on the other hand, simultaneous transmissions at neighboring locations on the same band interfere with each other. As a result, a primary cannot offer bandwidth at all locations, but must select an independent set of locations at which to offer it. Also, the choice of the independent set and the prices at those locations must be made jointly. We formulate price competition in a CRN as a game, taking into account both bandwidth uncertainty and spatial reuse. We analyze the game in a single slot, as well as its repeated version. In each case, we not only prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium, but also explicitly compute it. The expressions we obtain provide interesting insights into how the price competition evolves for different values of the system parameters. Moreover, for the game in a single slot, we prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the class of symmetric equilibria.
INTRODUCTION
The last decade has seen a tremendous growth in wireless networks, resulting in a proportionate increase in demand for spectrum. But spectrum is limited, which has led to the design of techniques such as Cognitive Radio Technology [2] , for using the available spectrum more efficiently. In Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs), there are two types of spectrum users: (i) a primary user who leases a certain portion (channel or band) of the spectrum directly from the regulator, and (ii) secondary users who can use the channel when it is not used by the primary.
We consider a CRN with multiple primary and secondary users in a region. Time is slotted, and in every slot, each primary has unused bandwidth with some probability, which he would like to sell to secondaries. Now, secondaries would like to buy bandwidth from the primaries that offer it at a low price, which results in price competition among the primaries. If a primary quotes a low price, it will attract buyers, but at the cost of reduced revenues. This is a common feature of an oligopoly [1] , in which multiple firms sell a common good to a pool of buyers. Price competition in an oligopoly is naturally modeled using game theory [13] , and has been extensively studied in economics using for example the classical Bertrand game [1] and its variants.
However, a CRN has several distinguishing features, which makes the price competition very different from oligopolies encountered in economics. First, in every slot, each primary may or may not have unused bandwidth available. So a primary who has unused bandwidth is uncertain about the number of primaries from whom he will face competition. A low price will result in unnecessarily low revenues in the event that very few other primaries have unused bandwidth, because even with a higher price the primary's bandwidth would have been bought, and vice versa. Second, spectrum is a commodity that allows spatial reuse: the same band can be simultaneously used at far-off locations without interference; on the other hand, simultaneous transmissions at neighboring locations on the same band interfere with each other. Thus, spatial reuse provides an opportunity to primaries to increase their profit by selling the same band to secondaries at different locations, which they can utilize subject to satisfying the interference constraints. So when multiple primaries own bandwidth in a large region, each needs to decide on a set of non-interfering locations (called independent set (I.S.)) within the region, at which to offer bandwidth. This is another source of strategic interaction among the primaries-each primary would like to select a maximum-sized I.S. to offer bandwith at; but if a lot of primaries offer bandwidth at the same locations, there is intense competition at those locations. So a primary would have benefited by instead offering bandwidth at a smaller I.S. and charging high prices at those locations. To the best of our knowledge our work is the first to consider either of these distinguishing features in context of price competition in wireless networks.
We model the problem using game theory, and our model captures both uncertain bandwidth availability and spatial reuse. We first consider (i) a one-shot game, in which bandwidth trading is done only once, and subsequently (ii) a repeated game in which there are an infinite number of slots, and bandwidth trading is done every slot. We analyze the games at a single location, and at multiple locations with spatial reuse constraints, and seek a Nash equilibrium [13] (NE) in each case.
In the one-shot game at a single location (Section 3), we show that there does not exist a pure-strategy NE, i.e., one in which each primary deterministically selects a price (Section 3.3). This is in sharp contrast with the Bertrand game [1] , where each seller always has his ware available -the only equilibrium then is a pure-strategy one in which each seller chooses the lowest possible price [8] . We then explicitly find a mixed-strategy NE in which each primary randomly chooses a price from a range, and prove that it is unique in the class of symmetric equilibria (Section 3.3). As the probability that a primary has bandwidth available decreases, this range of prices becomes increasingly concentrated at the highest possible price. This confirms the intuition that when spectrum holes are rarely available, whenever a primary has a spectrum hole, he can afford to set a high price in view of the limited competition he anticipates from others. Using the explicit expressions, we quantify the loss of total revenue incurred due to competition under symmetric equilibria (Section 3.4). Our numerical computations reveal that this loss, or equivalently, the efficiency of the symmetric equilibria, exhibits interesting threshold behavior, which we also analytically prove in the asymptotic regime (i.e., when the number of primaries is large).
Next, we consider a one-shot game when the primaries offer bandwidth at multiple locations arranged in a line and also in a square grid (Fig. 3 ) (Section 4), and prove that there exists a unique symmetric NE which we explicitly compute (Sections 4.1,4.2). When the number of such locations is even, there are two disjoint I.S. of maximum size, and we prove that at the equilibrium each primary selects between the two maximum I.S. with equal probability (Sections 4.1.1,4.2). When the number of locations is odd, there exists a unique maximum I.S., and a slightly smaller one. We show that when the bandwidth availability probability q is smaller than a threshold, all primaries offer bandwidth only at the maximum I.S. at equilibrium (Sections 4.1.2,4.2). This is because even though a primary would be able to charge a high price at each node by unilaterally deviating to the smaller I.S., he prefers to stay at the maximum I.S. because the latter is larger and the competition is likely to be limited. But when q exceeds the threshold, primaries randomize between offering bandwidth at the maximum and second largest I.S. (Sections 4.1.2,4.2). We explicitly compute the above threshold, the probabilities of the above selection as also the distribution for selecting the price at each node in the selected independent set for both odd and even number of locations (Sections 4.1.1,4.1.2,4.2).
Next, we analyze the repeated game version of the oneshot game at a single location (Section 5), and show that there exists an efficient NE in which each primary sets the highest possible price and as a result, the sum of expected revenues of the primaries is maximized. This is achieved through a threat mechanism: if any primary lowers his price in a slot, all others retaliate in future slots by playing the one-shot game NE strategy and hence the primary suffers in the long run.
Our main contribution is that we are able to explicitly compute NE in all the games we consider. Since the prices can take real values, the strategy sets of players are continuous. Thus, classical results do not establish existence and uniqueness of NE for the games we consider, and there is no standard algorithm for finding a NE, unlike when each player's strategy set is finite [13] . The explicit computations provide valuable insight; in particular, they clearly reveal the effect of the system parameters on equilibrium behavior. Due to space constraints, we only state and intuitively motivate the analytical results in this paper-the complete proofs can be found in our technical report [23] .
RELATED WORK
Pricing related issues have been extensively studied in the context of wired networks and the Internet; see [7] for an overview. Price competition among spectrum providers in wireless networks has been studied in [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] . Specifically, Niyato et. al. analyze price competition among multiple primaries in CRNs [17] , [18] . However, neither uncertain bandwidth availability, nor spatial reuse is modeled in any of the above papers. Also, most of these papers do not explicitly find a NE (exceptions are [14] , [17] ). Our model incorporates both uncertain bandwidth availability and spatial reuse, which makes the problem challenging; despite this, we are able to explicitly compute a NE. Zhou et. al. [19] have designed double auction based spectrum trades in which an auctioneer chooses an allocation taking into account spatial reuse and bids. However, in the price competition model we consider, each primary independently sells bandwidth, and hence a central entity such as an auctioneer is not required.
In the economics literature, the Cournot game and the Bertand game are two basic models that have been widely used to study competition among sellers in oligopolies [1] . In a Cournot game, sellers choose the quantity of a good to produce as opposed to prices in a Bertrand game, and hence the latter is more relevant to our model. In a Bertrand game, each seller quotes a price for a good, and the buyers buy from the seller that quotes the lowest price 1 [1] . Several variants of the Bertrand game have been studied, e.g., [4] , [5] , [6] , [22] . Osborne et al [4] consider price competition in a duopoly, when the capacity of each firm is constrained. Chawla et. al. [22] consider price competition in networks where each seller owns a capacity-constrained link, and decides the price for using it; the consumers choose paths they would use in the networks based on the prices declared and pay the sellers accordingly. The capacities in both cases are deterministic, whereas the availability of bandwidth is random in our model. The work most closely related to ours is the paper by Janssen et al [6] , which analyze the case where each seller may be inactive with some probability.
However, none of the above papers [4] , [5] , [6] , [22] consider the spectrum-specific issue of spatial reuse, which introduces a new dimension, that each player not only needs to determine the price of the commodity he owns (as in [4] , [5] , [6] , [22] ), but also select an independent set to compete in. The joint decision problem significantly complicates the analysis. Also, the results in [6] are restricted to the case of one buyer; but, a CRN is likely to have multiple secon-daries, which our model allows. This again complicates the analysis since multiple primaries can now sell their available bandwidths. Finally, unlike [6] , we consider repeated interactions among primaries, unequal probabilities of availability of unused bandwidth, random valuations for secondaries (Sections 5,6.1, 6.2).
PRICE COMPETITION AT A SINGLE LOCATION

Model
Suppose there are n ≥ 2 primaries and k ≥ 1 secondaries in a region. Each secondary may constitute a customer who requires 1 unit of bandwidth, or may simply be a demand for 1 unit of bandwidth. We initially consider the case that the primaries know k, and later generalize our results to allow for random, and apriori unknown, k. Time is divided into slots of equal duration. In every slot, each primary has 1 unit of unused bandwidth with probability (w.p.) q and 0 units w.p. 1 − q, where 0 < q < 1. We initially assume that the bandwidth availability probability q is the same for all primaries, but subsequently allow unequal probabilities in Section 6.1. A primary i who has unused bandwidth in a slot can lease it out to a secondary for the duration of the slot, in return for an access fee of pi. Leasing in a slot incurs a cost of c ≥ 0. This cost may arise, for example, if the secondary uses the primary's infrastructure to access the Internet. We assume that pi ≤ v for each primary, for some constant v > c. This upper bound v may arise as follows:
1. The spectrum regulator may impose this upper bound to ensure that primaries do not excessively overprice bandwidth even when competition is limited owing to bandwidth scarcity or high demands from secondaries, or when the primaries collude.
2. Alternatively, the valuation of each secondary for 1 unit of bandwidth may be v, and no secondary will buy bandwidth at a price that exceeds his valuation.
We initially assume that the primaries know this upper limit v, which is likely to be the case for the first interpretation. For the second interpretation, the primaries need not know the secondaries' valuations, -we consider this generalization in Section 6.2. Secondaries buy bandwidth from the primaries that offer the lowest price. More precisely, in a given slot, let Z be the number of primaries who offer unused bandwidth. Then the bandwidth of the min(Z, k) primaries that offer the lowest prices is bought (ties are resolved at random).
Game Formulation
We formulate the above price competition among primaries as a game, which is any situation in which multiple individuals called players interact with each other, such that each player's welfare depends on the actions of others [1] . In our model, the primaries are the players, and the action of primary i is the price pi that he chooses 2 . In Sections 3, 4, we study the interaction of the primaries in a single slot, which is referred to as the one-shot game. In Section 5, we consider a setting where the one-shot game is repeated an infinite number of times, referred to as the repeated game.
The utility or payoff of a player in a game is a numerical measure of his satisfaction level [1] , which in our context is the corresponding primary's net revenue. In (the one-shot version of) our game, the utility of primary i is 0 if he has no unused bandwidth. Let ui(p1, . . . , pn) denote his utility if he has unused bandwidth 3 and primary j sets a price of pj, j = 1, . . . , n. Thus, ui(p1, . . . , pn) = pi − c if primary i sells his bandwidth 0 otherwise
Recall that the distribution function (d.f.) [21] of a random variable (r.v.) X is the function:
where R is the set of real numbers. Now, a strategy [1] for primary i is a plan for choosing his price pi. We allow each primary i to choose his price randomly from a set of prices using an arbitrary d.f. ψi(.), which is referred to as the strategy of primary i. A d.f. that concentrates its entire mass on a single value allows a primary to deterministically choose this value as his price -such a ψ(.) is referred to as a pure strategy. The vector (ψ1(.), . . . , ψn(.)) of strategies of the primaries is called a strategy profile [1] . Let ψ−i = (ψ1(.), . . . , ψi−1(.), ψi+1(.), . . . , ψn(.)) denote the vector of strategies of primaries other than i. Let E{ui(ψi(.), ψ−i)} denote the expected utility of player i when he adopts strategy ψi(.) and the other players adopt ψ−i.
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile such that no player can improve his expected utility by unilaterally deviating from his strategy [1] . Thus, (ψ * 1 (.), . . . , ψ * n (.)) is a NE if for each primary i:
When players other than i play ψ−i, ψ * i (.) maximizes i's expected utility and is thus his best-response [1] to ψ−i.
Nash Equilibria
If k ≥ n, then the number of buyers is always greater than or equal to the number of sellers. So a primary i will sell his unused bandwidth even when he chooses the maximum possible price v. So the strategy profile under which all primaries deterministically choose the price v is the unique NE. So henceforth, we assume that k ≤ n − 1.
There is no pure strategy NE (i.e., one where every primary selects his price deterministically) in the above game.
(The proofs of Theorem 1 and all subsequent results can be found in [23] .) In contrast, in the Bertrand game, which corresponds to q = 1 in our model, the pure strategy profile under which each primary deterministically selects c as his prices is the unique NE [1] . This strategy profile is not a NE in our context as this provides 0 utility for each primary, whereas by quoting any price above c (and below v) each primary can attain a positive utility since he will sell his unused bandwidth at least when he is the only primary that has unused bandwidth which happens with positive probability (since q < 1). We have shown that no other deterministic strategy profile is a NE either (see our technical report [23] ).
Next, we focus on a specific class of Nash equilibria, known as symmetric Nash equilibria. A NE (ψ * 1 (.), . . . , ψ * n (.)) is asymmetric NE if all players play identical strategies under it, i.e., ψ * 1 (.) = ψ * 2 (.) = . . . = ψ * n (.). In practice it is challenging to implement any other NE -the simple example of two primaries and a NE of (ψ * 1 (.), ψ * 2 (.)) elucidates the inherent complications in the current context. If ψ * 1 (.) = ψ * 2 (.), then since players have the same action sets, utility functions and probability of having unused bandwidth (such games are referred to as symmetric games), (ψ * 2 (.), ψ * 1 (.)) also constitutes a NE. If player 1 knows that player 2 is playing ψ * 2 (.) (ψ * 1 (.) respectively), he would choose the best response ψ * 1 (.) (ψ * 2 (.) respectively), but he can not know player 2's choice between the two options without explicitly coordinating with him, which is again ruled out due to the competition between the two. Under symmetric NE, all players play the same strategy, and thus this quandary is somewhat limited -symmetric NE has indeed been advocated for symmetric games by several game theorists [3] . The natural question now is whether there exists at least one symmetric NE, and also whether there is a unique symmetric NE (only uniqueness will eliminate the above quandary). Note that some symmetric games are known to have multiple symmetric NE. For example, consider the simple "Meeting in New York game" [1] with two players, where each player can either be at Grand Central or at Empire State Building, and both receive unit utility if they meet and zero utility otherwise. The strategies where each player is at Grand Central, and where each player is at Empire State Building, both constitute symmetric NE. We prove existence of a symmetric NE, by explicitly computing one, and subsequently prove that it is the unique symmetric NE in our context.
We first provide the intuition behind our design of a symmetric NE. To simplify our exposition, we introduce the notion of "pseudo-price" for each primary. The pseudo-price of primary j, p ′ j , is the price he selects if he has unused bandwidth; p ′ j = v + 1 otherwise 4 . Consider primary 1 and let p ′ (k) denote the k'th smallest pseudo-price among the pseudo-prices of the rest of the primaries, i.e., p ′ j , j ∈ {2, . . . , n} (which 1 will know only after choosing his price or equivalently pseudo-price). Since the primaries choose their prices randomly and since their bandwidth availabilities are random, p ′ (k) is a random variable, and let F (.) be its d.f. If primary 1 offers a price of x, he sells his bandwidth only if p ′ (k) > x (since there are k secondaries who opt for the lowest available prices), which happens with probability (1 − F (x)); the sale fetches a utility of x − c. Then, primary 1's expected utility is (x − c)(1 − F (x)). Now, under NE, primary 1's price distribution being his best response to those of others, he must attain the same expected utility for the entire range of prices he is randomly choosing his price from, more technically, in the entire support set 5 of his price distribution; this is because his best response price distribution will never select from the less profitable ones which will not therefore be in its support set. Thus, (x − c)(1 − F (x)) is the same (i.e., a constant) for all x in the support set for his NE price distribution. Hence, F (x) is fully specified once this constant is known, which we determine by considering F (v). Note that F (v) is the probability that p ′ (k) ≤ v, which happens when k or more primaries have unused bandwidth (among those in {2, . . . , n}); this probability therefore 4 The choice v + 1 is arbitrary. Any other value greater than v would also work. 5 The support set of a d.f. is the smallest closed set such that its complement has probability zero under the d.f. [21] .
is w(q, n), where:
Thus, F (v) = w(q, n). Hence, the constant in question is
. The x at which F (x) = 0 provides the lower limit of this support set, which, from the above expression, is:
Thus,
We now only need to determine a price d.f. ψ(.) for each primary that leads to the above d.f. F (.) for the kth smallest pseudo-price of n − 1 primaries. Note that the pseudo-price for any given primary is less than or equal to x (where x ≤ v) whenever he has unused bandwidth and he quotes a price of x or less: the probability that both these events occur is qψ(x). Thus, since F (x) is the probability that k or more pseudo-prices (among those n − 1) are less than or equal to x, F (x) equals
for all x ≤ v. Thus, since we know F (.) from (4), we can compute ψ(x) = (1/q)φ(x), where φ(x) is the solution of the following equation:
We can in fact formally prove that: And, the symmetric NE price d.f. ψ(.) is:
From the properties of the φ(.) function obtained in Lemma 1, ψ(x) is a continuous d.f 6 . The above intuitive justification however glosses over some technical, nonetheless important, details: we implicitly assume that F (.) is continuous and that the set of best responses of a primary is a convex set. In the formal proof, we prove both the above for any symmetric NE and subsequently establish that:
Theorem 2. The strategy profile in which each primary i chooses his price pi according to ψ(.), where ψ(.) is defined by (6) , (5), (4) is the unique symmetric NE.
This random selection of prices as per ψ(.) can be interpreted as follows: each primary i sets a base price v and randomly holds "sales" to attract secondaries by lowering the price to some value pi ∈ [p, v] 7 . Example: For n = 2 and k = 1, we have w(q, n) = q, p = v − q(v − c), and
Remark 1. Our results readily generalize to allow for a random number of secondaries (K). Then the primaries apriori know only the probability mass function (p.m.f.) for K, P r(K = k) = γ k , but not the value of K. Unlike in (2) , we now define w(q, n) as:
Also, (5) is replaced by:
Now, ψ(.) computed as before, but with the above modifications in w(., .), φ(.), again constitutes the unique symmetric NE strategy of each primary.
Performance Evaluation under the Unique Symmetric NE
We first define the efficiency, η, of a NE as η = R NE R OPT , where R NE is the expected sum of utilities of the n primaries at the NE and R OPT is the maximum possible (optimal) expected sum of utilities. Note that R OPT is attained only when all primaries cooperate and each selects the maximum possible price v so as to ensure that bandwidth is always sold at this price. Clearly, η ≤ 1 quantifies the loss in total net revenue incurred owing to lack of cooperation among primaries. Also, owing to its uniqueness, the efficiency of the symmetric NE we obtain quantifies fundamental limits on the performance of symmetric NE. Now,
where Z is the number of primaries who have unused bandwidth (Z is a Binomial(n, q) r.v.). Also, as discussed in Section 3.3, at the unique symmetric NE, whenever a primary has unused bandwidth, he attains an expected utility of (v − c)(1 − F (v)) = (v − c)(1 − w(q, n)) irrespective of the price he offers. Thus, since there are n primaries and each has unused bandwidth with probability q, R NE = nq(1 − w(q, n))(v − c). Hence, Fig. 1 plots η of the symmetric NE that we obtain versus k for three values of q. It is interesting to note that η exhibits a sharp threshold behavior : for k below (respectively, above) a threshold the efficiency is close to 0 (respectively, 1). Also, this threshold is around nq, the expected number of primaries who have free bandwidth. Intuitively, this is because, when the supply nq exceeds the demand k for bandwidth (i.e., k < nq), there is intense price competition, driving down the equilibrium prices. On the other hand as k increases, w(q, n) decreases,p increases (see (3)), and becomes closer to v. Hence, the d.f. ψ(.) becomes increasingly concentrated at the highest possible price v. Intuitively, this is because, when the demand exceeds the supply, a primary expects to sell even at a high price, and sets his price accordingly. The plots for the density of the unique symmetric NE price distribution for different sets of values of parameters n, k, q reveal the same phenomenon as well (Fig. 2) .
In fact, we can analytically establish this threshold behavior for large n: Lemma 2. Let q ∈ (0, 1) be fixed.
2. If k ≥ (n − 1)(q + ǫ) for some ǫ > 0, then η → 1 as n → ∞. 
PRICE COMPETITION AT MULTIPLE LOCATIONS WITH SPATIAL REUSE OF SPECTRUM
We now consider the price competition game when primaries can simultaneously offer bandwidths at multiple locations. Each of the n primaries now owns a channel throughout a large region. The primary's own usage of the channel is such that in every slot, he either uses his channel throughout the region (with probability (w.p.) 1−q), or does not use it anywhere in the region (w.p. q). A typical scenario where this happens is when the primary broadcasts the same signal over the entire region, e.g., if the primary is a television broadcaster. Now, the region contains smaller parts, which we refer to as locations. For example, the large region may be a state, and the locations may be towns within it. We initially assume that there are k secondaries at each location, and later outline how the results can be generalized to allow for random and potentially unequal number of secondaries at different locations. As in Section 3, each primary quotes a price of at most v, and incurs a cost of c at each location at which it leases bandwidth.
We now describe the spatial reuse constraints that arise owing to simultaneous spectrum usage at multiple locations. The region can be represented by an undirected graph [20] G, called the conflict graph, in which each node represents a location, and there is an edge between two nodes iff transmissions at the corresponding locations interfere with each other. Recall that an independent set [20] (I.S.) in a graph is a set of nodes such that there is no edge between any pair of nodes in the set. Now, a primary who is not using his channel must offer it at a set of mutually non-interfering locations, or equivalently, at an I.S. of nodes; otherwise secondaries 8 will not be able to successfully transmit simultaneously using the bandwidth they purchase, owing to mutual interference. Thus, each primary must jointly select an I.S. at which to offer bandwidth, and the prices to set at the nodes in it. Primaries can randomize their selections over multiple I.S., and also over chosen price ranges.
A strategy of a primary now provides the price distribution he uses at each node and a probability mass function (p.m.f.) for selection among the I.S. (both selections contingent on having unused bandwidth).
Note that we allow a primary to use different (and arbitrary) price distributions for different nodes (and therefore allow, but do not require, the selection of different prices at different nodes), and arbitrary p.m.f. (i.e., discrete distributions) for selection among the different I.S. The definitions of NE and symmetric NE do not change.
We now argue that under any symmetric NE the price distributions at nodes are uniquely specified once the I.S. selection strategy is determined. Let there be M independent sets, and let each primary select among them as per the p.m.f. (r1, . . . , rM ) (recall that each primary uses the same p.m.f. under a symmetric NE). This provides the probabilities with which a primary offers bandwidth at each node when he has unused bandwidth (this probability for a given node equals the sum of the probabilities associated with all the I.S. that contain the node). Let this selection probability for node j be denoted αj . Then, considering that a primary has unused bandwidth with probability (w.p.) q, he offers it at node j w.p. qαj . The price selection problem at each node j is now equivalent to that for the single location case investigated in Section 3, the difference being that each primary offers unused bandwidth w.p. qαj , instead of q, at node j. Thus: Thus, a symmetric NE strategy is completely specified once the I.S. selection p.m.f. (r1, . . . , rM ) (which will in turn pro- 8 Note that secondaries are usually customers or local providers, and purchase bandwidth for communication (and not t.v. broadcasts). Thus, two secondaries can not use the same band simultaneously at interfering locations. vide the αj s) is obtained. We determine this p.m.f. for onedimensional and two-dimensional configurations of nodes.
For a one-dimensional configuration of nodes, we consider a graph G that is a linear arrangement of nodes as shown in part (a) of Fig. 3 (Section 4.1) , and for a two dimensional configuration we allow G to be a square grid of nodes as shown in part (b) of Fig. 3 (Section 4.2) . In both cases, we explicitly compute a symmetric NE, which also turns out to be unique in the class of symmetric NE. 
Linear Graph
Let Gm denote a graph that is a linear arrangement of m ≥ 2 nodes as shown in part (a) of Fig. 3 , with an edge between each pair of adjacent nodes. As an example, this would be the conflict graph for locations along a highway or a row of roadside shops. Let the nodes be numbered 1, . . . , m from left to right, and Io = {1, 3, . . .} and Ie = {2, 4, . . .} be the "odd" and "even" I. S. Note that Io and Ie are disjoint I. S., and Io ∪ Ie is the set of all nodes.
An intuitive property of any NE is that it does not allow a primary to select an I.S. that is not maximal (a maximal I.S. is one that is not a proper subset of any other I.S.). There are however several maximal I.S. in Gm, e.g., {1, 4, 6, 8, . . .}. The following lemma allows us to rule out all of them except Io, Ie under a symmetric NE.
Lemma 4. A primary never selects any independent set other than Io or Ie under a symmetric NE.
The proof relies on showing that if each primary in a given set of n − 1 primaries selects an I.S. other than Io, Ie with positive probability, the remaining primary's best response turns out to be a p.m.f. different from that used by the others -hence a p.m.f. that assigns positive probability to any such I.S. can not constitute a symmetric NE.
Lemma 4 implies that under a symmetric NE the p.m.f. for I.S. selection is characterized by a single probability t, with which a primary selects Ie; each primary selects Io with probability (w.p.) 1 − t. But, then, each primary selects a node in Ie (Io, resp.) w.p. t (1−t, resp.). Thus, αj = t if j ∈ Ie, and αj = 1 − t otherwise. We will next compute t under a symmetric NE for the cases m even and odd separately in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 respectively.
Even m
Let m ≥ 2 be even. Then, |Io| = |Ie| = m 2 and both Io and Ie have the maximum size among all I.S. (i.e., are maximum I.S.). We can show that t = 1/2 under any symmetric NE. The first step towards that end is to prove that under a symmetric NE each primary selects both Io and Ie with positive probability (i.e., 0 < t < 1). Now, given others' strategies, each primary's expected utility when he selects Io must equal that when he selects Ie; otherwise 0 < t < 1 does not constitute his best response as his utility can be increased by always selecting the one with the larger expected utility. As it turns out, since |Io| = |Ie| = m 2 , the two expected utilities are equal if and only if t = 1/2. Thus, under any symmetric NE, a primary competes at any given node with probability 1/2 (if he has unused bandwidth), i.e., the selection probability for node j, αj is 1/2 for each node j. Lemma 3 now provides the price distribution for each primary at each node, and thereby fully specifies a symmetric NE. Formally: 
Odd m
Now, let m ≥ 3 be odd. Then, |Io| = and Io is the unique maximum I.S. Each primary now faces the following quandary: (i) whether to offer unused bandwidth only at the nodes in Io and thereby try to sell bandwidth at the maximum possible number of nodes or (ii) to also choose the slightly smaller Ie hoping for limited competition there. The answers, and thereby the unique symmetric NE, turn out to be different depending on the value of w(q, n), the probability that k or more of the competitors of any primary have unused bandwidth.
The Case w(q, n) ≤ 2 m+1
:.
We can prove that under any symmetric NE, primaries offer unused bandwidth only in nodes in Io (i.e., t = 0). This happens because w(q, n) is so low, that a primary expects to sell his unused bandwidth at each node he offers, and hence he invariably selects the unique maximum I.S. The proof relies on the fact that the best response of any primary, irrespective of the I.S. selection strategies of others is to select Io; hence, under any symmetric NE, each primary selects only Io. Thus, the selection probability αj for any node j in Io (Ie, resp.) is 1 (0, resp.). Lemma 3 now provides the price distributions at the nodes, and thereby the symmetric NE. is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Remark 2. This symmetric NE, which unfortunately is unique, does not allow access to secondary users at nodes in
Ie. But, this scenario is unlikely to arise, especially for large m, as this requires very low availability probability q.
The Case w(q, n) > 2 m+1
:. Now, w(q, n) is high enough to motivate primaries to offer unused bandwidth in nodes in Ie with a positive probability, so as to utilize lower competition there. As before, under any symmetric NE, the value of t must be such that a primary's expected utility when he selects Io must equal that when he selects Ie. And, the only value of t that attains this equality is the root of the equation (in variable x), w(qx, n)(m − 1) − w(q(1 − x), n)(m + 1) + 2 = 0, (11) which we can prove to be unique in (0, 1). Thus, we can prove that under any symmetric NE, t is the unique root in (0, 1) of (11) . And, since αj = t for j ∈ Ie, αj = 1 − t for j ∈ Io, we have the price distribution at nodes from Lemma 3. Thus:
Theorem 5. Let m be odd and w(q, n) > 2 m+1
. The strategy profile in which, whenever a primary has unused bandwidth,
• selects Ie and Io with probability t and 1−t respectively, where t is the unique root in (0, 1) of (11), and
• selects the price at each node as per distribution ψ(.) in Section 3.3, with q replaced by qt (q(1 − t) resp.) whenever he selects Ie (Io resp.)
constitutes the unique symmetric NE.
It can be shown that the selection probability t for Ie is less than 1/2, and increases with m and tends to 1 2 in the limit as m → ∞. Fig. 4 shows an example. This is because as m grows, the ratio increases, and converges to 1. Thus, the symmetric NE converges to that for even m. Fig. 4 also shows that for all m, t is higher for q = 0.7 than for q = 0.5. This is because for a higher value of q, the competition at Io is more intense and hence primaries deviate to Ie with a higher probability. 
Grid Graph
Now, consider an m × m grid graph Gm,m, in which m Let Vij denote the node in the i'th row from the top and the j'th column from the left. Let:
In part (b) of Fig. 3 , the darkened and un-darkened nodes constitute I . The NE analysis is similar to that for the linear graph. We simply outline the results. We end this section with the following remarks which apply for both the linear and the grid arrangements. 
PRICE COMPETITION UNDER REPEATED INTERACTIONS
We now consider repeated interactions among primaries in multiple slots. We first formulate the problem in Section 5.1 and then describe our results in Section 5.2.
Formulation
We consider a repeated game [1] formulation for the oneshot game at a single location 9 described in Section 3, where the one-shot game is repeated an infinite number of times, at τ = 1, 2, 3, . . .. Each player perfectly recalls the actions of every player in all preceding times. The payoff 9 We omit interactions at multiple locations (Section 4) owing to space constraints. of player i for the overall repeated game is defined to be ui = ∞ τ =1 δ τ −1 ui,τ , where ui,τ is his payoff at time τ and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor [1] , which is used to discount future payoffs (see [1] , [13] for interpretations of the discount factor). The discount factor is usually close to 1 [1] .
A strategy of a player in a repeated game is a complete plan for choosing the action in each slot as a function of the actions of all players in all preceding slots [1] . As in a oneshot game (see Section 3.2), a Nash equilibrium (NE) in a repeated game is a strategy profile in which no player can improve his payoff by unilateral deviation from his strategy [1] . However, NE constitutes a rather weak notion of equilibria in repeated games [1] and hence we focus on NE with a special property, known as the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) [1] . A subgame [1] of the repeated game is the part of the game starting from some slot τ0 ≥ 1, i.e. the stage games in slots τ = τ0, τ0 + 1, . . .. An SPNE is an NE of the repeated game that is also an NE of every subgame [1] .
Results
It is well-known that for any repeated game, the strategy profile that uses the one shot game NE every time, is a SPNE [1] . Thus, the symmetric NE we presented for the one-shot game in Section 3 provides a SPNE in the repeated game version. The efficiency (as defined in the first paragraph of Section 3.4) of this SPNE is however low whenever the symmetric NE has low efficiency, which happens for certain ranges of n, k, q (Lemma 2). Our main contribution is to present an SPNE that is also efficient in the sense that the sum of expected utilities of the n primaries at equilibrium equals the maximum possible sum of utilities, provided the discount factor δ is sufficiently high.
We consider Nash reversion type of strategy profiles [1] in which each player plays a specified strategy (called the pre-deviation strategy) at each time until one of the players deviates from it, and all players play the one-shot game NE strategy thereafter.
Strategy for primary i: Select a price of v at τ = 1, and also for all other τ so long as all other primaries had chosen v in all previous times. Otherwise, play the one-shot game Nash equilibrium strategy ψ(.) in (6) .
Theorem 6. The above Nash reversion strategy is an SPNE if δ ≥ δt, where δt is a threshold given by:
, and
Note that from (2) and (12), w(q, n) > β(q, n) > 0 and hence 0 < δt < 1. Thus, for all values of n, k and q, there exists a threshold such that for values of δ greater than it, the above Nash reversion strategy is an SPNE.
The efficiency of the above SPNE is 1 because bandwidth is always sold at the highest possible price v. Thus, an efficient NE can be sustained in the repeated game, unlike in the one-shot game (Lemma 2). This is possible because of the threat mechanism inherent in the above SPNE: if a primary tries to undercut the prices of other primaries, then he will gain temporarily, but will suffer in the long run because all primaries will switch to the one-shot game NE strategy immediately afterwards.
We plot δt versus q in Fig. 5 for different values of n. The plot reveals that δt is not close to 1 except when q is close to 0. Thus, since players usually have discount factors δ close to 1 [1] , their discount factors would exceed δt except for very small q, and hence the above strategy profile will constitute a SPNE unless q is very small. The availability probability of unused bandwidth is rarely close to 0, and even when it is, we have an alternate SPNE strategy profile whose efficiency is very close to 1. Now, when q is very small, the lower limit p in (3), of the symmetric NE price distribution ψ(.) in the one shot game in Section 3 is close to the upper limit v (refer to (6) , (5), (4)), and hence the SPNE that uses this distribution for each player at each time provides prices close to v as well at each time, and thereby attains efficiency close to 1. 
GENERALIZATIONS
We now generalize the models to allow for asymmetric q values of the primaries (Section 6.1), and random valuations of the secondaries (Section 6.2).
Asymmetric q
So far, we have assumed that each primary has unused bandwidth with equal probability, q. Now, we consider that this probability is qi for primary i, and allow for potentially unequal qis. This generality leads to some remarkable differences in the NE strategies, which we elucidate considering a simple scenario, n = 2 and k = 1. Without loss of generality, let q1 ≥ q2.
We first describe the equilibrium strategies ψ1(.) and ψ2(.) of the two primaries for the one shot game at a single location. Define:p i = v − qi(v − c), i = {1, 2} Thenp1 ≤p2. Let ψ1(x) be as in (7) withp2 in place ofp and q1 in place of q. Also, let ψ2(x) be as in (7) withp2 in place ofp and q2 in place of q.
In a NE, this should be a constant over the range [p, vT ] for some c <p < vT and must equal:
E{ui(p, ψ−i)} = (p − c)(1 − F (p))P (v ≥p) = (p − c)P (v ≥p) (15) since F (p) = 0. By (14) and (15):
Note that since g(x) = (x − c)P (v ≥ x) is increasing, 0 ≤ F (x) ≤ 1 and F (x) is increasing. Now,p can be found from (13) and (16) 
Equations (16) and (18) provide an expression for φ(.). Also, similar to Theorem 2, we have: and φ(.) is defined by (16) and (18) is a symmetric NE.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We analyzed price competition in a CRN with multiple primaries and secondaries, taking into account bandwidth uncertainty and spatial reuse. We computed NE in linear and grid conflict graphs; an important problem for future research is the extension of these results to general conflict graphs. Also, we assumed that a secondary buys bandwidth if and only if the price is less than or equal to his valuation. This is an optimal strategy for a secondary in a one-shot game. However, for a repeated game, it may not be optimalfor example a secondary may choose not to buy bandwidth in a slot even if the price is less than his valuation, so as to induce primaries to lower prices in future slots. The analysis of price competition in the presence of such strategic behavior by secondaries is an interesting problem for future work. Finally, extension of the results in this paper to the case where each primary owns multiple bands is another direction for future research.
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